One moment in Kim Dong Won’s film A Repatriation almost gave me chills. (It wasn’t the adorable scene on the beach -- I just wanted to post that image). Do you remember when one of the grandpas answered his phone in the middle of the night? The person on the other side of the line was congratulating him because the possibility of repatriation had become a reality. Instead of the joyful outburst one might be expect, the grandpa answered with (or something to the effect of): “It’s not about being about to go to the North, it’s about being able to come and go as we please.” I thought that this statement really incapsulated the underlying argument for a reunified Korea. The right to live in the Korea of your choosing is surely an achievement, but the real problem is that people are being forced to choose in the first place.
This issue echoes the “choice” that Chinese POWs had to make at the end of the hot war, as we saw in War Trash. Chinese prisoners who chose Taiwan were forever tarnished by this decision, and were prevented from ever going back home. They could not move freely between countries allied with the U.S. and countries allied with China. They had one chance to choose and afterwards they would forever be separated by barriers of enmity. Likewise, I got the feeling that the grandpas would probably never have the opportunity to visit South Korea after their repatriation, and if they did, it would only be under exceptional circumstances. As they were leaving, they almost didn’t even dare to hope that letter communication could be maintained with their loved-ones in the south. This is an absurd notion, when you consider that the geographic distance between the two capitols is so negligible.
In an attempt to better understand why “going and coming” is so out of the question for even the most respected Korean citizens, I did a little bit of research. I was curious to see what contemporary scholars are saying about the possibility of reunification. I was trying to avoid obviously biased sources, like those from the U.S. or nations in close proximity to the Koreas. One scholar, Wojciech Stankiewicz, published an article in 2012 through the University of Warmia and Mazury in Poland (http://dspace.uni.lodz.pl:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11089/1063/05-stank.pdf?sequence=1). The article outlines three potential scenarios in which the reunification of Korea might be possible. Some of the assumptions of war start and end dates and general impressions of North Korea are clearly questionable, but I think it’s interesting that the author tries to imagine what reunification would look like in various situations.
The first model is described as:
“ . . . peaceful integration. This can be perceived as the most optimistic scenario, but in fact, it would be extremely difficult to perform. That kind of inter-Korean development would involve steps like: an initial acceptance of the status quo by the two Koreas and by four major powers which are the United States, China, Russia and Japan . . . What is more, a mutual recognition of that model would be indispensable. The next step would involve a formal peace treaty ... The integration itself, would entail levelling of each countries policy, which are completely different. Cooperation on economic level with limited political and social integration is required” (67).
The second model discussed is: “ . . . unification through default assumes a state failure in North Korea and an abrupt unification of absorption. This view
was particularly popular during the late 1980s and early 1990, with the
end of Cold War and widening of a yawning gap between the North and
South economic development. The general steps in the collapse scenario
begin from some kind of triggering event” (69).
The final model is “often referred to as the ”worst” end of spectrum.
Unification in that context would be an effect of war. This could be,
hypothetically, a repeat of the North invasion of the South, as happened
in 1950. Such similar action is rather not possible, because the US-ROK
alliance is very strong and this would be a suicidal action undertaken by
the North” (70).
Stankiewicz concludes the article on a pessimistic note. “Throughout the 1990s, enthusiasm for Korean reunification predictions has faded due to the resilience of the North regime. Although the underlying assumption of reunification remains, forecasts of when and how this will occur have been more restrained. Even the death of Kim Jong Il will not bring changed to domestic and foreign policy as
North Korea is going to continue adopt an aggressive approach toward
the South. In summary, in the short-term reunification is definitely not in
the interest of the current ROK administration, and the South has no
intention of encouraging it” (72).
It will probably be a very long time before “going and coming” is possible. In an interview with Cindy Yoon of The Asia Society, Kim Dong Won says that reunification is not considered as crucial an issue as it was in the past. When asked about the younger generation’s concern for the issue, he replies: “There is not as much hatred for North Korea, but I think there isn't as much concern about them. Young people are not so interested in that problem. Some say they don't want to reunify because it will be too costly. North Koreans are poor and they don't want to have that burden” (http://asiasociety.org/arts/film/kim-dong-wons-film-north-korean-prisoners-held-south-korea). I wonder if the time spent under U.S. occupation is causing South Koreans to forget. If the Cold War was about winning over hearts and minds, U.S. capitalist imperialism certainly seems to have hastened South Korea’s process of forgetting the vital cause that so many Koreans feel to strongly about. They don't want the "burden" that an influx of "poor" Northerners would put on the South Korean economy. Are the family ties that bound the two Koreas severed beyond repair? Perhaps the desire for economic success in the international arena in partly to blame.
--Sarah T.
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